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lives and stands firm in unbroken courage is the part that tells. Hence Beethoven soon drops that chant in order to sing the genuine song, that which he held valid throughout his life (from thirty-sixth to fiftieth measure)—“Upwards through tempest and night.” This is the song he sings. The storm never ceases, and his courage never permits itself to be broken, although in the whirl of the tempest the heart at one time threatens to succumb, and complains and sobs; and at one time everything—inner and outer storms—sinks away into breathless quiet.

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## CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY.

### PREFACE.

In the first and second volumes of this Journal I published in ten chapters an “Introduction to Philosophy,” designing therein to present in the simplest form certain fundamental insights (*aperçues*) which light the way to the purely speculative. These were not given in any strict order, but each chapter endeavored to start *de novo*, and to develop out of some common view the underlying speculative basis.

It is now proposed, in a series of chapters, to unfold a more systematic view of the totality which the speculative insight discloses to us as the truth of the Phenomenal world. This would be a genetic deduction of the categories of Pure Reason such as Hegel has attempted (successfully) in his Logic. In it would appear the frame-work of the MACROCOSM; and as the so-called “*Microcosm*” is “made in its image,” or, in other words, since the human mind is potentially the complete manifestation of the Reason which creates the World, it is necessary that a complete statement should show the psychological side to the Ontology which such a Logic furnishes. I shall therefore introduce at the beginning, and at certain stages of the progress, entire chapters devoted exclusively to making clear certain important psychological distinctions.

Besides the subjective aspect which must be removed from pure thought by a careful consideration of Psychology, there is a source of difficulty still more formidable: *historical complication*. It arises from the fact that the form of



exposition in one age or nation uses what seems a peculiar dialect to other nations and ages. Its strange and foreign air repels close study necessary for comprehension. The resolution of this latter difficulty is accomplished through a philosophical treatment of the History of Philosophy, wherein vanishes what is idiomatic and peculiar, letting appear the fundamental harmony that underlies great philosophical systems. Thus the threefold purpose of these chapters may be briefly stated:

I. To exhibit in their systematic connection the categories of Pure Thought.

II. To make careful separation of the psychological phases—distinguishing one stage of the culture of thought from another—and by this process to remove serious obstacles to the comprehension of the speculative solution of problems. This will involve frequent criticism of philosophic writings which confound the different provinces of thought.

III. To clear up the obscurity in different philosophical systems, and their apparent conflict, by a comparative criticism of their *technique*. Much reference will be had to the various translations hitherto published in this Journal, and thus many chapters may be regarded as commentaries on the same.

The strictness of “systematic connection” which I promise is not to prevail in the *style* of the exposition (as it does in Hegel’s writings), but only in the results exhibited. Thus the order in which parts of the system are taken up may be irregular, but it (the proper order and genesis of each) must be fully discussed so as to leave no doubt as to the rank of any given term in the series.

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#### PART FIRST.

##### THINKING *versus* SENSUOUS REPRESENTATION.

Most of the difficulties in the way of what is called “making Philosophy popular,” arise from the incapacity of uncultured people to think without having recourse to sensuous representation. Those who must use images of sense on all occasions have not the strength to seize pure relations, and hence cannot find the “constant in the variable”; they seize *this* and *that*, but in the movement of *change*, *phenomenality*,



and *self-relation*, they get utterly lost. From the point of view of Representation a speculative doctrine seems absurd and impossible. But the road is not long that leads from Representation to its self-contradiction.

The first business of the philosophical student is therefore to learn this distinction, and to know when he thinks, and when he merely *represents*. He must strive before all things to gain in himself this power to think—to think *exhaustively*. The child that can walk only by taking hold with its hands, compared with the man who can walk freely, furnishes the type of such as can think only with images. Poetic imagination is not the subject of discussion here: in it Representation comes under control of a higher, spontaneous activity of the Mind.

In the following chapters, this theme is continued in some of its most interesting phases.

#### CHAPTER I.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

On page 487 of the Lectures on Metaphysics, Hamilton complains of the “vagueness and confusion which are produced by the confounding of objects so different as the *images of sense* and the *unpicturable notions of intelligence*.” He says that “different names are given wherever a philosophical nomenclature of the slightest pretensions to perfection has been found.”

It would surprise us to find a writer, after so explicit a statement, falling systematically into the error he condemns. Such surprise is in store for us; for Hamilton does not by accident, by a slip of the pen, or by a moment of forgetfulness, fall into this error; *he builds on it the corner-stone of his whole philosophy*. He says—Metaphysics, p. 527:

“I lay it down as a law which though not generalized by philosophers, can be easily proved to be true by its application to the phenomena: that all that is conceivable in thought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictions, one must.”

Whether these contradictories are the famous “Antinomies” of Kant is a question we will defer for the present. The reader



will remember that Kant holds that "the understanding falls into these antinomies whenever it transcends its proper sphere." Hamilton, however, claims this doctrine as his own discovery (*Meta.* p. 647), in the following words :

"If I have done anything meritorious in Philosophy, it is in the attempt to explain the phenomena of these contradictions ; in showing that they arise only when intelligence transcends the limits to which its legitimate exercise is restricted ; and that within these bounds (the conditioned) natural thought is neither fallible nor mendacious."

Not only is this position claimed by Hamilton as the corner-stone of his system, but his followers lay stress on it and use it most frequently.

Since he does not attempt a scientific justification of this "law" which "can be easily proved to be true by an application to the phenomena," we must seek out a specimen of this "application"-species-of-proof which seems to be borrowed from the proof by "superposition" used in geometry. He applies it to space.

*Meta.* p. 527: "It is plain that space must either be bounded or not bounded. These are contradictory alternatives ; on the principle of Contradiction, they cannot both be true, and, on the principle of Excluded Middle, one must be true. This cannot be denied without denying the primary laws of intelligence. But though space must be admitted to be necessarily either finite or infinite, we are able to conceive the possibility neither of its finitude nor of its infinity.

"We are altogether unable to conceive space as bounded—as finite ; that is, as a whole, beyond which there is no further space. Every one is conscious that this is impossible. It contradicts also the supposition of space as a necessary notion ; for if we could imagine space as a terminated sphere, and that sphere not itself enclosed in a surrounding space, we should not be obliged to think everything in space ; and, on the contrary, if we did imagine this terminated sphere as itself in space, in that case we should not have actually conceived all space as a bounded whole. The one contradictory is thus found inconceivable ; we cannot conceive space as positively limited.

"On the other hand, we are equally powerless to realize in thought the possibility of the opposite contradictory ; we cannot conceive space as infinite, as without limits. You may launch out in thought beyond the solar walk, you may transcend in fancy even the universe of matter, and rise from



sphere to sphere in the region of empty space, until imagination sinks exhausted;—with all this, what have you done? You have never gone beyond the finite: you have attained, at best, only to the indefinite; and the indefinite, however expanded, is still always the finite. Both contradictions are equally inconceivable, and, could we limit our attention to one alone, we should deem it at once impossible and absurd, and suppose its unknown opposite as necessarily true. But as we not only can but are constrained to consider both, we find that both are equally incomprehensible; and yet, though unable to view either as possible, we are forced by a higher law to admit that one, but one only, is necessary.”

In this remarkable passage, in which Hamilton attempts to show that intelligence contradicts itself in the endeavor to decide upon the extent of space, the assumption must be that the operation of intelligence is the same throughout—otherwise the different results do not necessarily contradict. If I fail to find the bottom of a cistern with one stick while I can easily do it with another, this is no contradiction. But the words used to describe the mental activity in these processes are: *conceive, conscious, supposition, necessary notion, imagine, think, realize, launch out in thought, transcend in fancy, attain, attention, deem, suppose, constrained to consider, view, forced to admit.*

The Scotch philosophers, and especially Hamilton, have won great fame as psychologists. One must seriously doubt the justice of that fame in this instance. According to his own confession, a “philosophical nomenclature of the slightest pretensions to perfection” should discriminate between “images of sense and the unpicturable notions of intelligence,” and yet he builds a “law” on the plainest confounding of such operations as *imagining* and *thinking*.

Let us apply this distinction to the case he considers, and see how completely the contradiction vanishes.

I. Imagination or fancy (sensuous Representation) makes *images* of objects; and as images must have *limits* in order to have *form*, we could not expect to be able to imagine that which is infinite if such object could be found.

II. Thought (using the “unpicturable notions of intelligence”) contemplates the *nature* of an object, and attaches



predicates accordingly. It is no contradiction if its "unpicturable notions" cannot be *imagined*.

### III. *Thought of Space.*

1. Space if finite must be limited from without.
2. But such external limitations would require space to exist in.

3. And hence the supposed limits of space *posit* space beyond them instead of *negating* space—they prove space to be continuous and not finite. It appears, therefore, that space is of such a nature that it can end in, or be limited by, itself alone, and thus is universally continuous or INFINITE.

### IV. *Representation of Space.*

If the result attained by thought is correct, space is infinite; and if this is so, it cannot be *imagined* or *represented*. Therefore we are prepared to expect what Hamilton states as a result of the attempt to realize an image of space: "The imagination sinks exhausted."

If imagination had succeeded in "realizing" space it would have proved space to be picturable, and hence finite; and *here would have been a true contradiction*.

As it is, however, the impotency of imagination is a negative confirmation of the positive assertion made by thought.

## THE BOOK OF JOB CONSIDERED AS AN ART-COMPOSITION.

Translated from the German of J. G. Herder, by A. E. KROEGER.

The book contains a twofold scene, in heaven and on earth. Above, the action takes place; down below, the discussion. The lower knows not the meaning of the above, hence it counsels hither and thither: the daily condition of all philosophies and theodicies of the world.

The book has for its subject a sufferer—nay, an innocent and even bodily afflicted sufferer. Hence we pardon him all his sighs and complaints; for even a hero groans when suffering bodily pain. He sees immediate death before him and prays for it; his life is embittered; why should he not groan?